Who Owns Reality? Part 8
A story in nine parts.
Diverging perceptions of reality
The development of health, safety, and environment (HSE) practices in the 1990s was marked by a strong focus on cost-cutting and a period of diverging perceptions between companies, unions, and authorities. Toward the end of the decade, however, a shared recognition began to emerge: there was a need for renewed commitment to HSE.[REMOVE]Fotnote: RNNP 2001
For a long time, the industry maintained that safety levels were satisfactory, even though improvements had stagnated. Operating companies believed they were in control, and this attitude likely contributed to warning signs in the safety culture being overlooked.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Bodil Alteren, Solveig Gaupset, Terje Lie, Preben Lindøe, Espen Olsen, Helge Ryggvik, Jan Hovden, Trygve Steiro, Ranveig Kviseth Tinmannsvik, Tor Tønnessen. (2002) HMS-arbeid under endring. SINTEF. STF38 A03406. Microsoft Word – ORIGINAL Tema 4 HMS_arbeid_under_endring.doc At the same time, low oil prices and declining attractiveness of the Norwegian continental shelf led to increased emphasis on cost reductions. The industry placed its hopes in new technologies and internal reorganizations to secure its future.
The 1990s were also a period of major development activity, with several new fields coming online. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), which at the time was responsible for overall safety, lacked the capacity to keep up with the rapidly expanding operations. The unions, still weakened by earlier conflicts, had limited influence.
Several unions warned that the safety situation was deteriorating, but were often met with skepticism.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Stavanger Aftenblad. (1998, 24. september). Individual incidents – including some at Gullfaks – were downplayed, and the message from companies was that safety had never been better.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Stavanger Aftenblad. (2000, 27. juli). In parts of the industry, it was even claimed that safety issues were receiving too much attention and too many resources.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Bodil Alteren, Solveig Gaupset, Terje Lie, Preben Lindøe, Espen Olsen, Helge Ryggvik, Jan Hovden, Trygve Steiro, Ranveig Kviseth Tinmannsvik, Tor Tønnessen. (2002) HMS-arbeid under endring. SINTEF. STF38 A03406. Microsoft Word – ORIGINAL Tema 4 HMS_arbeid_under_endring.doc Some leaders suggested that union involvement in safety was driven by recruitment motives, and one Statoil executive went so far as to call it fearmongering.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Radio/NRK P1. (2000, 31. oktober).
A shift in attitudes
This perception of reality was challenged toward the end of the decade. In 1998 and 1999, two independent reports indicated that the potential for major accidents was increasing.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Vinnem, J. E. (1999). Offshore risk assessment: principles, modelling and applications of QRA studies, Kluwer og Ryggvik, H. (1999). Fra forbilde til sikkerhetssystem i forvitring: fremveksten av et norsk sikkerhetsregime i lys av utviklingen på britisk sokkel: Vol. nr 114. TIK-senteret, Universitetet i Oslo. The unions—particularly Nopef and OFS—played a decisive role in putting safety back on the agenda. After years of diminished influence, they had regained strength and used it to push for a renewed HSE debate.
Although the unions’ message was at times perceived as politically motivated, they eventually gained support from the authorities.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Bodil Alteren, Solveig Gaupset, Terje Lie, Preben Lindøe, Espen Olsen, Helge Ryggvik, Jan Hovden, Trygve Steiro, Ranveig Kviseth Tinmannsvik, Tor Tønnessen. (2002) HMS-arbeid under endring. SINTEF. STF38 A03406. Microsoft Word – ORIGINAL Tema 4 HMS_arbeid_under_endring.doc. s. 37. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development challenged the companies’ optimistic portrayal.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Bodil Alteren, Solveig Gaupset, Terje Lie, Preben Lindøe, Espen Olsen, Helge Ryggvik, Jan Hovden, Trygve Steiro, Ranveig Kviseth Tinmannsvik, Tor Tønnessen. (2002) HMS-arbeid under endring. SINTEF. STF38 A03406. Microsoft Word – ORIGINAL Tema 4 HMS_arbeid_under_endring.doc. Director General Gunnar Berge and Safety Director Magne Ognedal sent a letter to all license holders on the continental shelf – a clear reprimand.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Brev fra Oljedirektoratet til rettighetshavere, (2000, september). Nye tiltak for bedre sikkerhet, helse og arbeidsmiljø på den norske kontinentalsokkelen. Underskrevet av Gunnar Berge, Oljedirektør og Magne Ognedal, direktør med ansvaret for området oppfølging. Minister Sylvia Brustad followed up with a public warning to parts of the oil industry.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Stavanger Aftenblad. (2000, 14. september)
The challenge was the lack of a unified statistical basis for assessing risk levels on the Norwegian shelf. Still, it was clear that action was needed.
Leadership change and a new direction
In 1999, Harald Norvik was replaced by Olav Fjell as CEO of Statoil. Norvik stepped down following major cost overruns in the Åsgard development, and Fjell became the first CEO without a political background. As a finance executive, he brought a different approach, aiming to transform Statoil from a traditional oil and gas company into an integrated energy company—a vision that also included a new perspective on HSE and organizational development.
