2. December 20253. December 2025 by trude

Who Owns Reality? Part 7

Trude Meland

In the autumn of 1986, Statoil stood at a crossroads. After years of preparation, production began on Gullfaks – the company’s first major field as operator. What was meant to be a triumph was quickly overshadowed by a dramatic drop in oil prices. A large operations organization had to be restructured, and Gullfaks was hit particularly hard. Trust between employees and management suffered a serious blow – a crisis that would take years to mend.

A story in nine parts.

— Elin Trellevik and Stein Bredal in the office on board Gullfaks A. Stein Bredal was a key union representative and spokesperson for Norwegian oil workers during the 1970s and 1980s. He was deeply committed to improving working conditions, safety, and rights for offshore workers, and helped draw attention to the demanding and hazardous situations they faced. He is also known for being a sharp critic of the authorities and oil companies when he believed safety was being compromised in favor of production. Bredal was among the first to raise concerns about diver health and the long-term effects of saturation diving. Photo: Jorunn Birkeland/Norsk Oljemuseum

The autumn of 1986 marked a milestone for Statoil. After years of planning and development, production was finally set to begin on Gullfaks – the company’s great masterpiece and its first major field as operator. But just as optimism peaked, oil prices plummeted. What was meant to be a triumph quickly turned into a challenge.
The organization, painstakingly built to manage a large-scale operational unit, now faced a demanding restructuring. Staffing changes hit Gullfaks particularly hard. Such changes rarely come without resistance, and it didn’t take long before a crisis of trust emerged between employees and management – a crisis that would take years to heal.
A story in nine chapters.

Crisis at Gullfaks: Broken Trust, Leadership Criticism, and Weakened Cooperation

On September 11, 1994, Stein Bredal, union representative and acting chief safety delegate on Gullfaks A, broke his silence. He demanded that Statoil shut down production on the platform, citing several serious incidents that had compromised safety. Bredal issued strong criticism of the company’s leadership, accusing CEO Harald Norvik of maintaining an outdated and authoritarian leadership style. His statements received widespread media coverage, including in Dagbladet.

The following day, September 12, Statoil responded at a press conference. Communications Director Arild Steine questioned Bredal’s role, arguing that it was problematic for someone who was not formally the chief safety delegate to cause political unrest.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Dagbladet. (1994, 13. september). Statoil-angrep på tillitsvalgt. He pointed out that Bredal was onshore when he made the shutdown demand, and that under Norwegian law, only the safety delegate on the platform has the authority to make such decisions.

Steine’s remarks were interpreted as a reprimand of the safety delegate role, sparking strong reactions. The leader of the Federation of Oil Industry Workers (OFS) claimed the comments signaled an attempt to create a “yes-man culture” within the company, where critical voices were suppressed.

The issue also drew political attention. Minister of Local Government Gunnar Berge, who held ultimate responsibility for offshore safety, contacted Statoil and demanded a full review of the organization on Gullfaks A. He warned against undermining the authority of safety delegates but also emphasized that they must act responsibly and follow proper channels.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Dagbladet. (1994, 15. september) Berge krever konkrete tiltak.

The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) also responded to the criticism of Bredal. In a report, it affirmed that safety delegates not only have the right but also the duty to ensure that work is carried out in a way that safeguards health, safety, and welfare. At the same time, the NPD concluded that there was no basis for shutting down the platform.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Dagens Næringsliv. (1994, 13. september) OD stenger ikke Gullfaks A.

Leadership Philosophy and Breach of Trust

The discussion quickly evolved into a broader debate about Statoil’s leadership philosophy, downsizing, and Project 95. Terje Nustad, deputy leader of the Statoil Employees’ Association (SAF), argued that Statoil’s American-inspired management strategy stifled creativity and dissent. “Decisions are being forced upon us,” he said.[REMOVE]Fotnote: NTB. (1994, 16. september). SAF: Ja-kultur og jobbrotasjon hovedproblemer på Gullfaks.

SAF leader Leif Sande drew a direct link between downsizing and increased risk of human error. He pointed to a maintenance backlog of up to 10,000 work hours and highlighted frequent changes in platform leadership as a serious concern.

Platform manager Margareth Øvrum on Gullfaks A rejected the criticism, stating that “no one surpasses Statoil’s safety procedures.”[REMOVE]Fotnote: Rogalands Avis. (1994, 13. september). Statoil «frikjennes» av OD. However, the unions were united in their criticism of how Project 95 had been implemented. They claimed that agreements and regulations had been violated, and that the main agreement’s requirements for information and participation had been disregarded.

In Statoil’s internal magazine Status, Leif Dale expressed skepticism about the process. He believed the unions were being used merely as a formality in decisions that had already been made. While he assumed management had good intentions, he felt their actions did not reflect them.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Status. (1994) nr. 9. Behov for samarbeid om omstilling og sikkerhet.

Even Nopef, the union that had traditionally maintained a cooperative relationship with management, expressed disappointment. They felt that union representatives were being viewed as obstacles rather than assets.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Status. (1994). Nr. 8. Behov for samarbeid om omstilling og sikkerhet.

Acknowledgment and Investigation

Eventually, Statoil’s leadership, led by Harald Norvik, had to acknowledge that Project 95 had not gone as planned. The processes had not been sufficiently transparent, and the Gullfaks organization had been particularly affected – partly because many experienced leaders had been transferred to the Sleipner project.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Stavanger Aftenblad. (1994, 23. september).

A report from Rogalandsforskning supported the unions’ criticism. It concluded that Project 95 was characterized by ambiguity, a lack of democratic process, and only the illusion of participation.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Claussen, Tor. (1994). Moderne ledelse og moderne fagbevegelse. Rogalandsforskning 40/94. s. 14. According to sociologist Tor Claussen, the process gave the impression of being democratic, but in reality, the decisions had already been made.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Claussen, Tor. (1994). Moderne ledelse og moderne fagbevegelse. Rogalandsforskning 40/94. s. 43.

In September 1994, a supervisory group was established with representatives from the four unions, Statoil, and Norsk Hydro. The group concluded that safety was still acceptable but pointed to a negative trend within the organization: reduced efficiency, declining operational regularity, and a lack of genuine influence for large groups of employees.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Rogalands Avis. (1994, 6. oktober). Rapport. Samarbeid på Gullfaks må bedres.