Who Owns Reality? Part 6

A Series of Incidents and Growing Concern

In the autumn of 1994, the Gullfaks field became the focus of intense media attention following several serious incidents. Newspapers such as Dagbladet ran dramatic headlines: “240 in danger on platform,” “324 oil workers at risk,” and “A hair’s breadth from disaster.”[REMOVE]Fotnote: Dagbladet. (1994. 3. august). 324 oljearbeidere var i livsfare. Dagbladet. (1994, 9. august). Hårsbredd fra olje-katastrofe. The situation quickly escalated into a media frenzy, placing Statoil’s safety procedures under scrutiny.

It began in July, when a process technician on Gullfaks A discovered that a well valve—a so-called downhole safety valve—was defective during testing. The same issue had occurred the previous year, raising immediate questions: Had the valve never been repaired? Or had it failed again? Either way, the incident pointed to a backlog in maintenance. Without the valve, the well had only one barrier—the blowout preventer (BOP)—in violation of the requirement for two independent barriers.

Repairing the valve required a drilling rig, but the rig was occupied with drilling a production well. As a result, the repair was significantly delayed. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) chose not to criticize Statoil’s handling of the situation, and production continued without the valve being fixed.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Oljedirektoratet. Brev til Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet. Mottatt 20. oktober 1994. OD 49/ PGB/GMD. Rapport – Hendelser på Gullfaksfeltet.

Gas Leak and System Failure

On July 31, a gas pipe on Gullfaks A ruptured, releasing approximately 20,000 cubic meters of explosive gas.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Oljedirektoratet. (1994). Rapport etter tilsynsaktivitet i forbindelse med gasslekkasje på Gullfaks A 31.7.1994. Varsel om pålegg. The incident occurred during preparations for the annual maintenance shutdown. A choke valve between a high-pressure and a low-pressure pipe was missing, causing the low-pressure pipe to be exposed to excessive pressure and rupture. The gas flowed into a turbine operating at temperatures up to 750 degrees Celsius—a single spark could have triggered a catastrophe for the 324 people on board.

Statoil’s initial report identified the missing choke disk as the cause, but the NPD demanded a supplementary report. This revealed that the incident had a far greater potential for serious consequences than initially assumed. The NPD found the report lacking in key areas and identified several critical issues: failures in management, procedures, communication, and maintenance. Coordination between platforms and internal controls within Statoil were deemed inadequate.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Oljedirektoratet, brev til Statoil. Mottatt 31. august 1994. OD 94/ RA/KE. Rapport etter tilsynsaktivitet i forbindelse med gasslekkasje på Gullfaks A 31.7.1994 – Varsel om pålegg.

During the leak, the neighboring platform Gullfaks C continued to send gas to Gullfaks A, which could have significantly worsened the situation. The NPD drew parallels to the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988, where failure to shut down a neighboring platform contributed to the tragedy. The NPD concluded that those responsible on both Gullfaks A and C had failed in their duties.

More Incidents – Rising Anxiety

On August 19, an oil leak occurred during loading onto a tanker. The oil was drained into closed systems and did not cause pollution. Statoil described it as a random accident, but the incident drew attention due to its proximity to earlier leaks.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Oljedirektoratet. (1994). Brev til Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet. Mottatt 20. oktober 1994. OD 49/ PGB/GMD. Rapport – Hendelser på Gullfaksfeltet.

On September 6, another gas leak occurred. Half of the production had to be shut down immediately, while the other half continued thanks to two parallel separation trains—systems that allowed flexible operation. During the replacement of a damaged pipe, oil and gas were released uncontrollably, triggering gas detectors and indicating an explosion risk. The entire platform was automatically shut down.

Although the leak was smaller than the one in July, the NPD noted that the mistakes made bore clear similarities to previous incidents.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Oljedirektoratet. (1994). Rapport om tilsynsaktivitet i forbindelse med ukontrollert utslipp av olje og gass på Gullfaks A 6.9.1994. The Safe Job Analysis (SJA) had been poorly completed, and communication between organizational levels and individuals was inadequate—a pattern that would repeat in later events.

In September, faults were discovered in the fire extinguishing systems on two of the loading buoys at the Gullfaks field. All helicopter traffic was halted, and the NPD once again pointed to weaknesses in Statoil’s maintenance systems.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Oljedirektoratet. (1994). Brev til Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet. Mottatt 20. oktober 1994. OD 49/ PGB/GMD. Rapport – Hendelser på Gullfaksfeltet.

Criticism from the Petroleum Directorate

On October 12, the gas alarm sounded for the third time that autumn. Magne Ognedal, Director of Safety at the NPD, issued strong criticism of the Gullfaks organization. He pointed to significant management failures, particularly on Gullfaks A, where cooperation between leadership and employees was described as unacceptable. Maintenance work was piling up, and attitudes toward safe operations, order, and cleanliness were found to be lacking.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Stavanger Aftenblad. (1994, 6. oktober). Rot på Gullfaks A