A Drone Drama with Energy‑Security Stakes
In mid‑September it was made public that unidentified drones had been
observed at several platforms on the Norwegian continental shelf. They
were said to have moved within the 500‑metre safety zone around the
installations. One of the first reports came from Gullfaks C—two
suspicious lights observed in the early hours of 10 September. As the
month went on, new reports arrived of observations at several
installations. This had multiple implications.
Air traffic issues
The first consequence was relatively down‑to‑earth and practical:
unauthorised traffic in the airspace is a problem for other types of
traffic. Bristow’s chief pilot, Sondre Nordseth, put it plainly:
“Drones are, as a rule, a major safety risk. As soon as they fly in the
same airspace, they can create dangerous situations.”[REMOVE]Fotnote: Stensland, Kristine M. 2022. Ukjente dronar sett offshore: – Viktig å vera observant. In: Stavanger Aftenblad (digitally published 21 Sept.)
In that respect the situation was reminiscent of the Russian fleet’s
exercise near Norwegian installations in 2007. Back then, several
helicopter flights had to be cancelled because it was deemed too
dangerous to combine civilian helicopter traffic with Russian military
aircraft exercising in the same area.
Security policy
The second implication was far more fundamental. The 2007 incidents
later appeared to reflect a somewhat careless Russian exercise
practice. The drone observations in 2022, by contrast, occurred after
Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine. The security‑policy climate had
deteriorated markedly. Russia was now seen as a clear candidate to be
behind the drone flights—possibly as preparation for sabotage against
offshore infrastructure.[REMOVE]Fotnote: See for example Vikingstad, Jonas 2022. Frykter russisk sabotasje i
Nordsjøen: – Vi kan ha gitt bort mye informasjon. In: Stavanger Aftenblad
(digitally published 27 Sept.) That lent a very different gravity to the way the observations were interpreted. Key parts of Europe’s energy supply could be at stake.
The situation escalated further when explosions were registered on 26
September at the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea.
Soon the leaks were visible on the sea surface. The incidents were
treated as sabotage and, following an overall assessment, Norwegian
authorities tightened the security regime around petroleum installations
on the shelf. Allied naval forces also contributed to guarding duties.
In addition, key onshore infrastructure (such as Kårstø) received
enhanced protection, including from the Home Guard.
Investigation: opening phase
Of the 115 reported drone observations at Norwegian petroleum
installations in 2022, four criminal cases were opened. These concerned
violations of the Petroleum Act’s provisions on a 500‑metre no‑fly zone
around installations on the Norwegian shelf. It proved difficult to
secure technical evidence that drones had in fact been observed—and,
not least, to determine who might have been behind them.
Prosecutor Christine Kleppa elaborated: “Once we interviewed people, we
saw a high degree of uncertainty among witnesses compared with their
initial reports to the police. Still, we were left with a handful of
cases where the witnesses were very sure about what they had seen; the
observations were made in daylight, and what they described was a
drone.”[REMOVE]Fotnote: Stormark, Kjetil 2023. Slik etterforsket de dronehendelsene. In:
Politiforum (digitally published 2 March).
https://www.politiforum.no/slik-etterforsket-de-dronehendelsene/236181
External expertise was also brought in to compare the observations with
the star field at the time. This work was closely tied to an
investigative group with the somewhat unusual name “Celestial Bodies”
(Norw. himmellegemer). The establishment of such a group was, as Head
of Section Amund Preede Revheim of the Southwest Police District put
it, “the first time in police history.”[REMOVE]Fotnote: Ibid.
Investigation: conclusions
In line with the findings of the “Celestial Bodies” group, the police
assessed that an observation at the Kristin field on 19 September was
the planet Jupiter, brightly illuminated. The police conclusion for the
10 September observation at Gullfaks C was that one of the lights was
likely a nearby vessel, while the other was probably the Gullfaks B
platform.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Ibid. The four criminal cases linked to drone observations were
dropped in January 2023.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Nrk.no 2023 (news brief, digitally published 19 Jan.)
https://www.nrk.no/nyheter/alle-saker-om-droneobservasjoner-pa-norsk-sokkel-er-henlagt-1.16263925
The investigations into the sabotage against Nord Stream 1 and 2 were
discontinued by Sweden and Denmark in February 2024. The Swedes
explained that “it is not considered possible for Swedish authorities to
pursue the investigation further (…) The preliminary investigation was
opened to determine whether the sabotage was directed at Sweden and thus
threatened Sweden’s security. The investigation has shown that this was
not the case.”[REMOVE]Fotnote: Säkerhetspolisen.se 2024. Förundersökning om grovt sabotage läggs ned (digitally published 7 Feb.) https://sakerhetspolisen.se/ovriga-sidor/nyheter/nyheter/2024-02-07-forundersokning-om-grovt-sabotage-laggs-ned.html The Danes stated there was not “sufficient basis to pursue a criminal case in Denmark.”[REMOVE]Fotnote: Politi.dk 2024. Københavns Politi og PET’s fælles efterforskning av
sprængningerne av Nord Stream indstilles (digitally published 26 Feb.)
https://politi.dk/koebenhavns-politi/nyhedsliste/koebenhavns-politi-og-pets-faelles-efterforskning-af-spraengningerne-af-nord-stream-indstilles/2024/02/26
Vulnerability and suspicion
The drone observations and the subsequent media coverage set in motion a
process that revealed significant vulnerabilities in Norwegian
infrastructure tied to petroleum activities. At the same time, they
tested the threshold at which Norwegian authorities will launch extensive
protective measures on the shelf. In other words, the events of autumn
2022 offered valuable preparedness training for dealing with a heightened
threat level.
Taken together, all of this clearly indicated a shift in mindset toward
greater suspicion in a tougher security‑policy climate, where increasing
resources will be devoted to a growing adversary to the east.
